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Your friend invites you to a concert. “It’s an accessible venue,” they say, “so you should be 
able to join us!” The sentiment is nice (you guess). Your friend has at least considered your 
access needs before inviting you to an event. They clearly haven’t planned their choosing the 
event around your access needs, however. You go online to buy a ticket. While the venue’s 
website says the venue is indeed accessible, there is nowhere for you to purchase a specific 
ticket recognizing your accessibility needs. You then email the address you find on their 
website for customer service concerns. You are sure to ask detailed questions about what 
type of  accessibility options are available, where they are available, and how you can access 
them. You do this because the simple question of  “is your venue accessible and how?” is 
often not enough for you to get the types of  answers you need. You wait two days for a 
response. The response turns out to be (surprisingly) wonderfully helpful! Customer service 
responded to all your questions with detailed advice. You look forward to attending the 
concert with your access needs met.
But is this truly the case—have all such access needs been met? Let’s presume you show 
up to the concert venue and all proceeds smoothly. What were the conditions that led up 
to this achievement of  access? The point of  this paper is to show that a focus on logistical 
access fails to account for a variety of  accessibility needs and perhaps the question “have 
your needs been met?” isn’t even the right question to ask in the first place if  we want to 
generate responses to ableism that take seriously the depths to which it penetrates. 
For example, in the above scenario, it is clear that your friend, while perhaps well 
intentioned in inviting you, has done so in a way that shows a lack of  desire or capacity to 
imagine their life and plans being shifted given access concerns. The presumption is one 
of  accommodating you in existing plans, rather than preparing a plan for themselves and 
others that begins from an awareness of  ableism and an ethics of  accessibility. Additionally, 
while the venue was built to be accessible, there were a set of  emotional, cognitive, and 
physical labors that went into the various exchanges between you and your friend and 
you and the customer service agent. Perhaps your friend’s framing of  their invite caused 
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you to feel like a burden or a last-minute addition. Perhaps after thinking this, you tried to 
comfort yourself  with the sentiment, “well, at least they tried.” (Meanwhile, your friend 
pats themself  on the back for inviting you in a way that recognized your access needs). In 
addition to this emotional labor, you performed the cognitive labor of  verifying certain 
accessibility accommodations and figuring out how, when, and where to access them, as well 
as the physical labor of  typing an email.1 None of  this emotional, cognitive, or physical 
labor was shared nor was it acknowledged by any individual or institution. And yet, all your 
access needs were “met.” 
The achievement of  what we might call logistical, accommodationist access fails to 
fully appreciate the depths of  access-related issues. In what follows, I survey the state of  
disability activism as it relates to notions of  access, comparing rights-based vs. justice-based 
platforms. I claim that rights-based frameworks, those working primarily from a logistical, 
accommodationist lens, ultimately fail to envision the depths of  transformation necessary 
to address our current ableist world. I then turn to justice-based frameworks and the notion 
of  “access intimacy” that has emerged from these activist circles. Finally, I explore access 
intimacy through the lens of  critical phenomenology, which I argue helps illuminate the 
problems with a rights-based framework and makes clear the stakes for building a more 
liberatory access framework. 
Critical phenomenology begins from a set of  philosophical (and sociopolitical) 
assumptions concerning the self  and the world that differs from rights-based approaches 
to accessibility. The subject of  critical phenomenology is not the bounded, unified 
individual we find in rights-based approaches. Rather, in attending to the structures of  lived 
experience, critical phenomenology provides a relational, intersubjective understanding of  
the self. Beginning from this notion of  the self, the stakes of  accessibility are (re)clarified. 
If  our social world is not comprised of  individuals conceived of  as bounded units for 
accessibility programs to “bring into” its existing organization, then accessibility can be 
expanded to include attention to some of  the most fundamental elements of  our ways 
of  living, acting, and being. Accessibility would thus be about intervention at the level of  
our sedimented patterns of  relating and belonging. Additionally, critical phenomenology is 
particularly attentive to how our familiar patterns of  inhabiting the world are informed by 
structural patterns of  oppression. Methodologically, a critical phenomenological approach 
aims to “[suspend] commonsense accounts of  reality in order to map and describe the 
1 Arlie Hochschild has used the term “emotional labor” within the context of  wage-based labor to 
describe the work of  employees within professions requiring them to regulate their emotions in particular 
ways (1983). Many uses of  “emotional labor” have arisen since Hochschild’s original coining of  the term, 
which have expanded this definition to include arenas outside the “workplace.” I am using the term 
more broadly than Hochschild here (and perhaps in ways she may reject—see The Atlantic’s 2018 article 
“The Concept Creep of  Emotional Labor” by Julie Beck) to simply remark on the type of  unnoticed, 
unappreciated, and non-reciprocal energies expended in interactions and relationships that demand such 
acknowledgement. Specifically, I am using it to address the unnoticed, unappreciated and non-reciprocal 
labor of  disability access. 
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structures that make these accounts possible, to analyze the way they function, and to open 
up new possibilities for reimagining and reclaiming the commons” (Guenther 2019, 15). 
Accessibility beyond a rights-based framework and informed by critical phenomenology 
would thus attend to a host of  intersecting oppressions—ableism, racism, sexism, sizeism, 
classism, heterosexism—to name a few.
Fundamentally, I propose that access is not a practical and isolated thing or event. It is not 
about what one person or institution can do for another person but involves an ongoing, 
interpersonal process of  relating and taking responsibility for our inevitable encroachment 
on each other. At base, access intimacy invites attention to our fundamental intersubjectivity, 
our inherent vulnerability, and the asymmetries of  power in any relationship. Beginning from 
these assumptions, the question of  whether access needs are met cannot fully be answered via 
attempts at equalizing or accommodating (though these are nonetheless necessary elements 
of  access in our present moment). It must be answered through the development of  individual 
and collective (re)orientations, ways of  being responsive to our  primary interdependence. 
 
I. DISABILITY ACTIVISM: ACCESSIBILITY, RIGHTS, AND JUSTICE
Accessibility has been a vital concern for those concerned with disability rights and 
justice. The tensions between disability “rights” and “justice,” however, illuminate the 
different resonances “access” can have. In a rights-based framework, where the norms 
of  inclusion and equality are paramount, access becomes mainly about specific logistical 
achievements of  “accommodation” (Mingus 2017). For example, disability activism in the 
late 20th century U.S. succeeded in establishing legal provisions through the Americans 
with Disabilities Act (ADA) requiring most business and facilities to provide “reasonable 
accommodation” for all disabled clients, customers, and members of  the public.2 This 
has mainly included addressing mobility constraints with ramps or elevators or providing 
communication accommodations such as braille or captions. More recently, this has also 
included the use of  content or trigger warnings to address mental health conditions. 
The radical nature of  the ADA at the time of  its inception and today should not go 
understated. Working against a history of  social and physical isolation and discrimination 
of  disabled individuals, the ADA helped to conceptually transform the focus on disability as 
a so-called “defective” state of  an individual to a “defective” state of society, demonstrating 
the move from a medical model to a social model of  disability (Silvers 1996).3 At their best, 
legalistic approaches have fundamentally and forcefully altered built environments to allow 
for a range of  individuals with various disability statuses to literally be together in space. 
2 Notwithstanding the ambiguity of  “reasonable” here as well as the implicit emphasis on physical dis-
abilities, this style of  rights-based activism has made significant legal, civil, and social gains. 
3 The ADA did not create the social model of  disability, which was born in the UK in the 1970s; rather, 
the ADA used the social model of  disability in its language and policies.
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The ADA signaled a public attempt at rectifying the exclusion of  disabled individuals, thus 
contributing significantly to the necessary material and symbolic anti-ableist transformation 
of  society. Yet too often in practice rights-based frameworks fall short of  the radical 
transformative potential of  disability activism by allowing legalistic, accommodationist 
inclusion to be its pinnacle achievement. Such accommodationist inclusion allows for 
change only insofar as the central structures and values of  society are maintained. For 
example, independence remains valorized and so “access” amounts to disabled individuals 
independently accessing those spaces that non-disabled individuals can now access. The 
focus here is on individual inclusion into such spaces, rather than the radical alteration of  
these spaces to prevent the need for individual accommodations in the first place.4 The 
legalistic, rights-based framework of  access ultimately assumes independence as a condition 
of  equality and then presumes equality as a matter of  sameness, thus leaving intact 
fundamental pillars of  an ableist society.
Certain assumptions regarding the ontological status of  the self, the sociopolitical 
landscape, and the goals of  liberation are evident here. First, a rights-based platform holds 
a liberal, atomistic view of  the self. That is, the bounded, singular individual is the locus 
of  concern—access accommodations are directed at or for the individual. Additionally, 
rights-based frameworks employ a reactive approach to the way in which the organization of  
society is expected to change. The primary goal is fitting disabled individuals into a world 
constructed through ableist thought and practice rather than transforming the conditions 
of  such a world in the first place. The goals of  liberation in a rights-based platform thus 
include granting greater individual freedoms in an accommodationist fashion. 
Various problems arise with the rights-based framework. First, accessibility remains 
positioned as a retroactive “fix.” This framework fails to anticipate disability in the world 
and correspondingly fails to build a world where disability is assumed, centered, and valued. 
Rights-based notions of  accessibility generate the façade of  aspirational total independence 
and self-reliance, neglecting to acknowledge the ways in which no one fully “independently” 
accesses spaces or relies on themselves to achieve their goals. Our agency or our ability to 
access spaces (both built and social) is supported (or not) given one’s proximity to the norms 
and values of  a given society.5 Take for example the norms of  our current capitalist society 
and the case of  chronic illness, pain, or fatigue. In capitalist societies, bodies are evaluated in 
terms of  their productivity and their ability to contribute to a competitive economic market. 
In this context, rights-based accessibility accommodations more often than not entail what 
Aurora Levins-Morales describes as “better access to exploitation [and] greater integration 
4 Consider the discourse and practice of  the accessibility philosophy of  “universal design” here. In brief, 
universal design is defined as “the design of  products and environments to be usable by all people, to the 
greatest extent possible, without the need for adaptation or specialized design” (The Center for Universal 
Design, 2008).  
5 Consider here María Lugones’s discussion of  “active subjectivity” in Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes (2003).
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into a profit-driven society that is driving thousands of  species toward mass extinction and 
making the planet uninhabitable for humans” (2019, 51). If  this is the case, the “work” 
of  rights-based accessibility ends where capitalism begins and a whole host of  bodies and 
minds remain structurally precluded from access-related care and concern. Bodies and 
minds that cannot be accommodated by a capitalist system that emphasizes efficiency and 
productivity and produces alienation and exploitation (and oftentimes disability itself) are 
left out of  rights-based discussion of  access, narrowing our field of  concern for fighting 
ableism and advancing more liberatory futures. Levins-Morales continues: “The last thing 
we need is more opportunities to do our part in keeping the interlocking wheels of  class, 
white supremacy, heteromale supremacy, and imperialism turning” (51). 
If  we are to truly transform our present ableist world, we need to seek fundamental 
changes to such norms, values, and ways of  being, knowing, and acting. Accessibility is 
not simply about logistics or building a “check-list” style response to inaccessibility (e.g., do 
we have ramps, braille, etc.). There is a difference between a reductive notion of  physical 
access as accommodation and a more transformative notion of  physical access that begins 
with a commitment to broaden access from the start. The latter views access as embedded 
in the reasoning for creating built environments themselves; bringing together differently 
embodied folks becomes a core design feature. Additionally, a radical conception of  access 
goes beyond physical means and demands attention to the wealth of  social, emotional, and 
mental diversities of  ways to inhabit the world. The use of  content warnings has marked 
a transition from ignoring to recognizing various psychological diversities. However, when 
used to “accommodate” students by merely excluding them from the classroom space or from 
engaging with the material, content warnings do little to anticipate and construct a space 
acknowledging a range of  social and psychological backgrounds.6 Rather, understanding, 
anticipating, and valuing such a range of  experiences is key to developing a more just and 
anti-ableist world. Transformative notions of  access attend to the conditions in which we 
are able to (or not able to) materially and socially build the types of  communities we want. 
In this way, a deeper understanding of  accessibility concerns practices of  world-making 
(and re-making) themselves rather than inclusion into an already existing (ableist) world.
Thankfully, disability activists have already began this important work under the heading 
of  disability justice. The disability justice framework was launched in 2005 by individuals 
working within progressive and radical movements fighting ableism. Disability justice has 
emerged as a burgeoning movement whose founding members include Patty Berne, Mia 
Mingus, Stacey Milbern, Leroy Moore, Eli Clare and Sebastian Margaret (Berne 2015). 
In 2015, the performance collective launched its “10 Principles of  Disability Justice.” 
In this statement, Sins Invalid describe disability justice’s commitment to anti-capitalist, 
6 Here I am thinking of  content or trigger warnings that “accommodate” by simply removing a student 
from the classroom space or removing a resource from the syllabus for a student without further 
pedagogical attention to the matter. This absolves a professor of  responsibly discussing course content in 
ways that are more radically inclusive.
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intersectional solidarity-building and “cross-movement organizing” and “cross-disability 
solidarity.” As the authors state: 
 
We cannot comprehend ableism without grasping its interrelations 
with heteropatriarchy, white supremacy, colonialism, and capitalism, 
each system co-creating an ideal bodymind built upon the exclusion 
and elimination of  a subjugated “other” from whom profits and 
status are extracted. (2015) 
 
Disability justice understands all bodies as “unique and essential” and as “[having] 
strengths and needs that must be met” (Sins Invalid 2015). This is not a problem to be 
overcome, but the position from which we generate new ways of  relating and belonging. If  
we begin from our inherent interdependence (instead of  from aspirational independence) 
and acknowledge world-making as a collective human practice, a different set of  demands 
for access are raised. Access involves not only the literal inclusion of  disabled people into 
spaces but addressing the fundamental conditions of  our ableist status quo. Deeper issues 
of  access include the cognitive and affective dimensions of  (in)accessibility and the isolation 
faced by disabled individuals as they navigate getting their access needs met. While as a 
society we might perform the motions of  providing accessibility at discrete moments in 
time, there will remain ongoing elements of  access to address, involving everyday feeling, 
habits, values, and worldviews.7 Attending to these elements of  access commits us to more 
transformative thought and action. Liberatory endeavors demand transformation at the 
level of  our interpersonal patterns of  relating and belonging, which are inextricably tied 
to the material and social structures in which we find ourselves. Interpersonal relations 
are not divorced from the context of  our built, spatial relations; they are crucial to any 
fully “world”-shaping struggle. In the remainder of  this essay, then, I turn to the notion of  
“access intimacy,” a term used to name the feeling, practice, and politics of  interpersonal 
relationships as they work to shape the world differently. 
 “Access intimacy” is a term introduced by writer, educator, and activist Mia Mingus 
on her blog, Leaving Evidence, in a post entitled “Access Intimacy: The Missing Link” (2011). 
Mingus introduces the term to address the interpersonal and socially transformative 
elements of  access typically neglected in standard rights-based approaches to access. Access 
intimacy is about liberatory access rather than what we might call integrationist access. It 
demands collective attention to reshaping the norms, values, and beliefs structuring our 
world. For Mingus (2017), access intimacy refers to a mode of  relation between disabled 
people or between disabled and non-disabled people that can be born of  concerted 
7 I use the term “elements” of  access to capture myriad facets of  accessibility beyond singular, easily 
identifiable, and oftentimes physical access needs. “Elements” suggest the intertwining nature of  physical 
and mental/emotional needs related to access and also of  interpersonal and institutional dimensions of  
transformative notions of  access. 
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cultivation or instantly intimated and which centrally concerns the feeling of  someone 
genuinely understanding and anticipating another person’s access needs. Against a rights-
based framework of  accessibility that prioritizes the logistics of  access, such as if  a ramp 
is in place to accommodate movement with wheels, Mingus’s notion of  access intimacy 
calls attention to a deeper level of  access needs. She writes: “the weight of  inaccessibility is 
not just about ramps, ASL interpreters, straws and elevators . . . . It is just as much feeling 
and trauma as it is material and concrete” (2012). Access intimacy centers recognition 
of  the impact of  inaccessible environments on disabled (and non-disabled) people and the 
norm of  abled-existence, instead of  taking access achievement as its main goal.8 It demands 
abled people inhabit the world of  disabled individuals rather than better “fitting” disabled 
individuals within the abled world (Mingus 2017). Access intimacy is the shared sensorial, 
epistemological, and political labor of  transforming the grounds from which inaccessibility 
is expressed and understood.9
While it is often used to name the specific skill disabled individuals have in 
understanding other disabled individual’s needs, writer and activist Leah Lakshmi 
Piepzna-Samarasinha has been keen to point out that access intimacy is not necessarily 
“automatic” or “magical”; it is a “process and learnable skill” and can thus be developed by 
disabled and abled individuals alike “through asking and respecting [disabled individuals’] 
knowledge” (2018, 252). In what follows, I take as my point of  departure the provocations 
of  Mingus and Piepzna-Samarasinha to consider access intimacy as a practice that 
generates different (anti-ableist) values, norms, and habits for conceiving accessibility. 
 
II. ACCESS INTIMACY: FEELING, PRACTICE, AND POLITIC
In her blog posts, Mingus (2011) develops the notion of  access intimacy in relation 
to disability justice, interdependence, love, and forced intimacy, among other themes. In 
these pieces, she describes: 1) the feeling of  access intimacy, 2) the structures of  the practice 
of  access intimacy, and 3) access intimacy’s relation to liberatory world-building. I address 
these three elements of  access intimacy in what follows.
Mingus explores in great detail the feeling of  access intimacy from her perspective as 
a disabled individual, describing it as the “closeness [she] would feel with people who my 
disabled body just felt safer and at ease with.” The feeling of  access intimacy is that “elusive, 
hard to describe feeling when someone else ‘gets’ your access needs.” This comfort, she describes, is 
purely on an access level, meaning that it is not characterized by emotional or political 
intimacy, sexual attraction or romantic desire (though access intimacy may be expressed 
8 This is of  course a main goal, but not the “end” of  access as a liberatory practice. 
9 “Shared” here does not signal “same” or even “singular.” According to Mingus, access intimacy feels like 
conditions in which access needs can be freely expressed and are met without expectations of  repayment 
in the form of  emotional currency or senses of  ownership.
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within any of  these other intimate relations). It is a “freeing, light, loving feeling” that 
emerges from the ease of  sharing or not having to perform the emotional and cognitive 
labor related to building access (2011). Access intimacy works against feeling the “weight” 
of  inaccessibility, described by Mingus as:
 
The fear of  being left by the people you love and who are supposed to 
love you. The pain of  staring or passing, the sting of  disappointment, 
the exhaustion of  having the same conversations over and over 
again. The throbbing foolishness of  getting your hopes up and the 
shrinking of  yourself  in order to maintain. It is an echoing loneliness; 
part shame, part guilt, part constant apology and thank you. (Mingus 
2012)
 
For Mingus, access intimacy is not charity, an ego boost, or a trade for survival. It is a feeling 
that both generates and is an expression of  new patterns of  relating and belonging. It builds 
certain structures or forms of  living, being, and relating.
Access intimacy is thus importantly also a practice. For Mingus, it can describe cultivated 
forms of  intimacy or instantaneous connections. That is, one might experience access 
intimacy as a result of  years of  relationship-building or she might experience it through 
a more fleeting, ephemeral, singular experience with a stranger. We may call the former 
“patterned-access intimacy” and the latter “passing-access intimacy.” These describe two 
types of  interpersonal relationships defined by their temporal dimensions. While these 
relations may be different in appearance and expression, I don’t think they are different 
in terms of  the kind of  conditions and relations they generate. Both require an underlying 
awareness and cultivation of  norms, attitudes, and values against the grain of  dominant 
ableist society (though this does not have to be self-consciously articulated to oneself).10 
Whether one experiences access intimacy to be born of  transparent self-cultivation or 
instantaneous connection, it is fundamentally about an orientation emergent from and reliant 
on enacting certain ways of  relating and belonging (either repeatedly in passing interactions 
or within a patterned relationship). Indeed, patterned-access intimacy may condition one 
to enact passing-access intimacy as a habitual practice itself; that is, one’s patterned practice 
of  access intimacy in an enduring interpersonal relationship might condition one’s habitual 
openness to the passing practice of  access intimacy in everyday interpersonal encounters. 
What is important is that both patterned and passing access intimacy share a backdrop 
wherein individuals have built or are building anti-ableist patterns of  relationality. As 
Mingus describes, this way of  relating: 
 
 
10 Experiencing disability does not make one automatically capable of  providing access intimacy. Instead, 
whether constantly cultivated or instantly intimated, access intimacy emerges from the backdrop of  
certain decisions about how one is going to live and orient themselves to others.
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. . . . has looked like relationships where I always feel like I can say 
what my access needs are, no matter what. Or I can say that I don’t 
know them, and that’s ok too. It has looked like people not expecting 
payment in the form of emotional currency or ownership for access. 
It has looked like able-bodied people listening to me and believing 
me. It has looked like people investing in remembering my access 
needs and checking in with me if there are going to be situations that 
might be inaccessible or hard disability-body-wise. (2011)
 
As a practice, then, access intimacy is an emotional, cognitive, and physical labor, though 
it is not necessarily oriented toward achieving a specific access goal. As Mingus notes, 
“[s]ometimes access intimacy doesn’t even mean that everything is 100% accessible. 
Sometimes it looks like both of  you trying to create access as hard as you can with no 
avail in an ableist world” (2011). There is a sense in which the core of  access intimacy lies 
in “staying-with” the constant struggle of  inaccessibility—going through the mess with 
someone who understands, takes seriously, co-commiserates, and affirms the reality of  the 
situation. Thus, access intimacy is a type of  “interdependency in action” that “calls upon 
able bodied people to inhabit our (disabled people’s) world” rather than fitting disabled 
people into the abled world (2017). By assuming the inherent value of  disability and valuing 
disabled people’s lived experiences, access intimacy calls for a relational transformation of  
being and becoming-different together. 
Finally, while access intimacy is a practice rooted in interpersonal relationships, it is 
fundamentally a liberatory, world-building exercise. Access intimacy helps develop an ethical 
orientation to the world that is relational and interdependent in nature. Rooted in a disability 
justice framework, it demands social transformation rather than mere integration, reform, or 
adjustment. Against the myth of  independence and the high value placed on striving to 
be independent, access intimacy calls for a shift from individual to collective responsibility 
for access. Instead of  relying on disabled individuals to identify and instigate access needs, 
access intimacy shifts the field and locus from which access needs are articulated. That is, 
it seeks to build the liberatory conditions in which access can be grounded and take place, 
developing a different value system and thus different expectations and commitments for 
“access” in the first place: access is no longer simply a need of  disabled people but a need 
of  the ableist world. What I mean by this is that access intimacy urges us to direct our 
attention to the deficiencies of  an ableist world rather than the supposed deficiencies within 
individual bodies that must be “corrected.” As a world-building politics, access intimacy 
fundamentally rejects the status quo, seeking transformation of rather than inclusion into the 
abled world. Ultimately, as Mingus describes, “access shifts from being silencing to freeing; 
from being isolating to connecting; from hidden and invisible to visible; from burdensome 
to valuable; from a resentful obligation to an opportunity; from shameful to powerful; from 
rigid to creative” (2017).
In this section I’ve outlined the tripartite dimensions of  access intimacy as a feeling, 
practice, and political vision. These dimensions are interrelated. For example, the feeling 
of  access intimacy that Mingus wishes to capture emerges from a particular character 
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of  a relationship. Additionally, access intimacy concerns a specific type of  project: it is 
a project of  world-building through the development of  interpersonal practices shaped 
by the recognition and value of  interdependence and body/mind variation. Furthermore, 
there are large-scale political implications given the values, norms, and attitudes shaping 
interpersonal relationships of  access intimacy. Beginning from the point of  interpersonal 
relationships, access intimacy is the hinge for generating both a particular transformation 




III. CRITICAL PHENOMENOLOGY, ONTOLOGICAL INTIMACY,  
AND CONCRETE INTIMACY
In the previous section, I outlined Mia Mingus’s description of  access intimacy. Mingus 
depicts access intimacy along multiple registers: personal feeling, practical orientation, 
and sustained political vision (micro, mezzo, and macro levels, respectively). In this 
section, I will outline how access intimacy can be understood philosophically, particularly 
through the methodological lens of  critical phenomenology. My reason for using critical 
phenomenology here is twofold. First, it radically challenges the oftentimes taken for 
granted notions we have concerning the relations between selves and between selves and 
the world. Critical phenomenology fundamentally challenges understandings of  the subject 
as distinct and bounded. In so doing, it provides a different field of  reference to creatively 
think through some of  our most pressing social problems. Second, in attending to the 
structures of  experience in a world built via patterns of  oppression, critical phenomenology 
enacts a liberatory political practice by “struggl[ing] for liberation from the structures that 
privilege, naturalize, and normalize certain experiences of  the world while marginalizing, 
pathologizing, and discrediting others” (Guenther 2019, 15). My aim is ultimately to clarify, 
deepen, and explore the notion of  access intimacy through this lens. 
Kym Maclaren (2018) discusses intimacy in the context of  critical phenomenology in 
her essay “Intimacy as Transgression and the Problem of  Freedom.” The typical approach 
to understanding intimacy in the context of  structural oppression is to envision intimacy 
as something affected by systemic forces of  oppression, but not “in itself  an institution or 
practice that strips us of  freedom” (18). It seems to follow, then, that in liberating our 
intimate relations from external structures of  oppression we might produce a safe haven 
from or even build resistance to society’s oppressive forces. In this rendering, a critical 
phenomenological approach to intimacy interrogates and develops ways of  living that 
mitigate the systemic forces of  oppression that hinder it. But Maclaren takes a different 
approach. She argues that our intimate relations are themselves the site of  a fundamental 
imposition of  “unfreedom” that would remain even if  all systemic forms of  oppression 
ended. She names this fundamental imposition “ontological intimacy” (20). She remains 
interested, however, in theorizing the promotion of  greater freedom, agency, and 
becoming for individuals. In exploring the multiple layers of  what she calls “concrete 
intimacy,” Maclaren argues that by “owning up to the unfreedom that we inevitably 
                                               Shifting the Weight of Inaccessibility • 86Desiree Valentine
Puncta    Vol. 3.2    2020
impose upon our intimate others, and learning, precisely through an acknowledgment 
of  that inevitable imposition of  unfreedom” we “will enable the cultivation, 
within intimate relationships, of  forms of  agency that can stand up to and transform systems 
of  oppression” (27, 19).
Maclaren’s vision of  intimacy is grounded in a phenomenological view of  the subject 
and freedom. She differentiates this view from the Cartesian conception of  the self  as 
atomistic, individualist, and self-governing. Any limits to this bounded Cartesian self  
enacting their agency are imagined as coming from the outside, from external relations of  
power that are imposed on an otherwise freely acting self. When it comes to intimacy, the 
Cartesian account understands intimacy in terms of  certain beliefs and feelings one has 
concerning another person. In this account, intimacy arises when one believes one knows 
another and feels known by them or feels the same way as another person. This type of  
intimacy operates at the level of  distinct consciousnesses generating representations of  the 
other. Intimacy here does not equate to actually being with another but being with a version 
of  another generated by beliefs and feelings one has about another person. As Maclaren 
writes, on the Cartesian view, “it is only our judgments and feelings that are intimately 
present to us” (2018, 21). We are in a sense locked into our individual ways of  making sense 
of  the world and encounter others’ behaviors only as objects in our world.  
Against the Cartesian model, Maclaren follows a Merleau-Pontian account of  intimacy 
and of  the experience of  selves in the world. In this account, the other first “touches us, 
moves us, inhabits, and is inhabited by us” rather than being first “represented by us” (2018, 
21). Prior to the other being experienced as an object, they are what Maclaren (through 
Merleau-Ponty) describes as a “co-intentionality: a coexistence towards the world” (23). In 
this account, we do not simply discover other consciousnesses “out there” in the world, for 
they are “already at work within our ways of  being in the world” (22). Maclaren provides 
the example of  a child showing a parent a worm found in the dirt. Initially excited by their 
find, the child is redirected by the parent’s intentionality, which suggest, through a bodily 
response, that “dirty” is “bad.” This “sweeps the child’s experience up and carries it along 
with it to relevant realities in the world.” In effect, “the parent’s stance transgresses into the 
child’s and attunes him in a certain way towards the world of  dirtiness and cleanliness” (23). 
This element of  transgression lies in sharp contrast with the Cartesian model, according to 
which there is “no such seeing with” (24). In the Merleau-Pontian model, transgression into 
others’ worlds is immediate and fundamental. As Maclaren writes:
 
The rules, policies and norms into which I am disciplined carry 
with them . . . visions of what it is to be a subject, and my proper 
relation to self, others, work, knowledge, and so on. But these rules 
that we live by are themselves communicated to me, for the most 
part and most powerfully, not by explicit assertions but by the bodily 
behaviors and embodied attitudes of others. (22)
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Our intimate encroachment on others and their intimate encroachment on us is something 
that is ongoing and fundamental, according to Maclaren. This need not be understood as 
a negative form of  disciplining, however, but as a condition of  learning, acting, and being 
itself. The transgression of  others on our experience “open[s] up for us new possibilities 
while also revealing the limitations of  our characteristic modes of  sense-making.” It is only 
because we “co-inhabit others’ perspectives” and “are drawn into their way of  perceiving 
or they transgress into ours” that new dimensions of  reality are opened for us. This 
transgression into another’s perspective, named “ontological intimacy,” forms the basis 
of  all interpersonal relating. It is ontological in the sense that “it occurs simply by virtue 
of  the kinds of  beings we are—intersubjective beings” and a matter of  intimacy because 
“the other touches and shapes me not just from the outside, but within my most ‘private,’ 
personal experience” (24). 
Access intimacy is both informed by and a response to our ontological intimacy. 
Access intimacy explicitly calls our attention to the various failures of  acknowledging the 
fundamental ways in which we are intertwined as human beings. It contests the notion 
that subjects are or can ever be fully cut off from one another. Access intimacy, then, 
implicitly accepts a phenomenological account of  selves as fundamentally intersubjective 
and interdependent. Beyond making these ontological claims, however, access intimacy 
makes explicit the ethical stakes of  the matter: if  we are tied in these ways by virtue of  our very 
being, how will we respond? This question is central to addressing ableism and inaccessibility. 
What makes access intimacy something worth naming and claiming in the first place is the 
utter lack of  interest in or attention to the many failures of  responsibility occurring on both 
interpersonal and institutional levels regarding access. Therefore, the ontological intimacy 
underpinning notions of  access intimacy invites us to ask new questions regarding what is 
required to build a more liberatory world. For instance, what does it mean to be constituted 
by others, especially when it comes to the variety of  bodyminds we inhabit?11 How ought 
we respond to power asymmetries inherent in interpersonal relationships, especially 
those where one partner may need the other for their immediate survival? In what ways 
are individuals in an interpersonal relationship transformed by virtue of  their everyday 
intimacies?12 In the final section of  this paper, I address these questions in greater depth. 
11 I take this term from Sami Schalk’s Bodyminds Reimagined: Disability, Race, and Gender in Black Women’s 
Speculative Fiction (2018) to refer to the inextricable enmeshment of  body and mind. 
12 Much work addressing these questions has been done within feminist relational ethics. Particularly, 
the notion of  autonomy has been transfigured from a vision associated with Cartesian ontologies of  
the self  and freedom to one recognizing the ways in which “individual” autonomy is supported via 
intersubjective relationships and broader institutional structures. The term “relational autonomy” has 
been used to capture this. Additionally, as relational theorists make clear, it is not only the case that 
we are empirically relational in that we influence and shape the lives of  others around us, but that our 
relationality is fundamental and essential to the existence of  selves. For further reading, see Mackenzie 
and Stoljar (2000) and Downie and Llewellyn (2012). 
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Maclaren provides helpful heuristics for answering these questions in her analysis of  
concrete experiences of  intimacy. She understands concrete intimacy as operating on 
two interrelated levels: momentary mutual recognition and shared habits of  recognition 
that persist through time. Together, these produce the philosophical architecture for how 
we might reconceive practices of  liberatory world-building. While ontological intimacy 
constitutes our fundamental being-with others and is thus operative to some extent whether 
we are engaging with a stranger or close intimate, concrete intimacy may be experienced 
as an ephemeral, in the moment interaction and/or as the development of  shared habits 
enduring through time. Distinguishing concrete intimacy from ontological intimacy 
helps us understand the harmful or beneficial character of  everyday encounters which 
are mediated through ontological intimacy. There are ways in which one’s fundamental 
encroachment on another can be (and often is) painful, alienating, and oppressive. Consider 
the earlier example of  the child and parent provided by Maclaren. The parent’s redirection 
of  the worm as “dirty” or “bad” can produce an alienating effect on the child wherein 
their initial self-image as a “good explorer” is supplanted by the image of  themselves as 
“bad and dirty.” This, then, would not be an example of  concrete intimacy. For Maclaren, 
there can be momentary concrete intimacy without shared habitual concrete intimacy 
and shared habitual concrete intimacy without momentary concrete intimacy. However, 
concrete intimacy is most fully realized when the two work together such that the “layer 
of  shared institutions supports mutual recognition and growth, and the layer of  current 
mutual recognition can nourish and transform the shared institutions” (2018, 28). 
Mingus’s account of  access intimacy distinguishes between two levels or registers in 
which access intimacy may occur, as well. To recall, access intimacy as described by Mingus 
can be experienced through what I’ve called “passing” and “patterned” access intimacy. 
These appear to loosely map onto the fleeting and lasting forms of  concrete intimacy 
described by Maclaren, respectively. In a moment of  passing access intimacy, individuals 
establish an instantaneous connection wherein one (or both) individuals anticipate and 
recognize fully the other’s access needs. Via the establishment of  patterned access intimacy, 
routines of  anticipating and recognizing another’s access needs form over time. For Mingus, 
these are represented as two distinct expressions of  access intimacy. What makes access 
intimacy transformative and a world-building endeavor, however, is when these layers work 
together so that passing encounters fostered by access intimacy become an orientation 
or way of  life and patterned relationships provide the field of  reference for the ongoing 
enactment of  freedom found in the sense of  mutual recognition and shared becoming. 
A fuller account of  access intimacy will require further attention to enduring patterns of  
relating and belonging and the momentary mutual recognition that occurs within these 
relationships.
Maclaren describes enduring patterns of  relating and belonging through the language 
of  “interpersonal institutions.” Interpersonal institutions are patterned behaviors or 
structures of  relating shared between individuals. Think here of  the mundane within an 
intimate relationship: “shared customs around dinner-making, money-spending, television-
watching, and conflict.” These are microcosmic instances of  interpersonal institutions that 
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coalesce to provide a “specific character . . . in the ways in which these dynamics establish 
and support a certain identity and position for each member of  the relationship” (2018, 
29). This character provides a frame of  reference for actions and installs shared values and 
assumptions. It “found(s) an ‘intersubjective or symbolic field . . . which is our milieu, our 
hinge, our jointure’” (Merleau-Ponty 2010, cited in Maclaren 2018, 29). Key to interpersonal 
institutions is the sense in which they are ongoing practices without an explicit purpose. 
Rather, such practices are about generating the dimensions of  a shared field of  learning, 
living, acting, being and perhaps most importantly, becoming. When it comes to access, then, 
a more liberatory account of  accessibility would emphasize the generation of  this shared 
field rather than the literal achievement of  what we now tend to understand as “access” 
(legalistic, logistical, rights-based access). Access intimacy invites us to practice forms of  
care and what I would call sociopolitical and epistemological orientations to the world as 
practices of  access themselves. For instance, a disability justice framework encouraging 
the development of  access intimacy would include attention to and remedies for social 
isolation in the face of  unachievable logistical access. If  inaccessibility is characterized not 
only by logistical challenges, but the generation of  certain feelings—such as “the fear of  
being left by the people you love and who are supposed to love you, the pain of  staring 
or passing, the sting of  disappointment, the exhaustion of  having the same conversations 
over and over again”—which are brought on by the failure to acknowledge ontological 
intimacy (resulting in failed concrete intimacy), then accessibility will need to respond to these 
concerns on a sociopolitical, epistemological, and phenomenological level (Mingus 2012). 
 
 
IV. THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL ETHOS OF ACCESS INTIMACY
In this concluding section I elucidate the ways in which access intimacy is not only a critical 
phenomenological practice but an ethical one. It involves what we might call an ethos of  
accessibility. I use the term “ethos” to describe how a transformative notion of  accessibility 
primarily entails the development of  a certain character or fundamental orientation to 
the world rather than adherence to certain rules of  action. In line with my earlier critique 
of  disability rights and other legalistic approaches to access, an ethos of  accessibility goes 
beyond responding to a checklist of  duties. Instead, it speaks to what is basic to human 
existence, our ability to care and be connected to others and to connect in ways that 
manifest possibilities for human flourishing. Maurice Hamington describes the “corporeal-
centered epistemology” of  Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology that “demonstrates care to 
be a human capacity that can be developed or suppressed through habits” (2004, 39). 
While Hamington is speaking in the register of  “care” and in conversation with and 
against care ethics as an established field of  study, his attention to what an embodied 
ethos entails is helpful. If  the body is our medium for having a world, the body is also 
the medium for morality, according to Hamington, and we can choose to cultivate our 
fundamental bodily capacities for care or allow them to deteriorate. “Bodily” capacities 
here should not be reduced to “physical” capacities for care but rather include a range 
of  possible body/mind interactions. Additionally, such a phenomenologically-based ethics 
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does not remain at the level of  the individual but expands to include the cultivation of  
social habits informing both private and public realms.
What would an ethos of  accessibility entail in a disability justice framework centering 
access intimacy? If  our goal is to build more liberatory forms of  relating and belonging, what 
practical elements ought we acknowledge? Since, as Maclaren describes, concrete intimacy 
is most fully realized in a situation in which interpersonal institutions and momentary 
recognition work in tandem to build freedom, I will discuss access intimacy in the context 
of  these enduring relationships.
If, ontologically, we inevitably intimately transgress into the worlds of  others, then in 
situations of  close, enduring relationships, the ethical task of  managing such transgressions 
becomes most apparent. The goal then, as Maclaren writes, is to: 
 
. . .  live our enduring relationships, with their inevitable transgressions 
and their resulting institutions, in ways that allow for genuine 
becoming: for a creative taking up and expressive transformation 
of  the past, for the establishment of  new institutions—personal and 
interpersonal—that better support each person’s growth. (2018, 33) 
 
For Maclaren, freedom is understood as becoming and is realized in a process of  creative 
self-transformation. It is not about isolated choices in a given instant but generating a new 
way of  life itself. Ultimately, this development of  freedom concerns a certain responsibility 
one has by virtue of  their inevitable transgressions onto/into another. Supporting and 
promoting an intimate other’s becoming requires partners to help each other allow new 
ways of  life and of  being to germinate, opening each other up to the tensions within each 
person’s shared field of  reference and “to find therein an impetus and means for going 
farther, for self-overcoming, and for realizing new, freer ways of  being [themselves]” (35).
In disability justice circles, “crip doulaing” is one term used to help identify this work 
of  germination and freedom-building. In conversation with Stacey Milbern, Leah Lakshmi 
Piepzna-Samarasinha reflects on Milbern’s terminology of  crip doulaing, or the process of  
“crips mentoring and assisting with birthing into disability culture/community, different 
kinds of  disability, etc.” This experience is both ubiquitous in disability communities and 
invisibilized in an ableist world. Crip doulaing concerns the rebirth of  the self  as disabled 
or as differently disabled. It is a practice of  becoming that involves, as Milbern describes, 
“learning how to get medicine, drive a wheelchair, hire attendants, change a diet, date, have 
sex, make requests, code switch, live with an intellectual disability, go off meds, etc.” (quoted 
in Piepzna-Samarasinha 2018, 240). Support in navigating this process is indispensable and 
necessary in a world that lacks such structures of  support. Naming “disability doulaship” 
helps build alternative worlds with lexicons acknowledging the role of  doulaship. As Piepzna-
Samarasinha describes, the transition to becoming disabled within an ableist culture is 
often seen as a type of  death or end to one’s previously abled or more-abled self, but:
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. . . naming disability as a space we can be born into, not alone but 
supported and welcomed by other disabled people—and then again 
and again as we acquire new disabilities or discover words for things 
that have been there all along—that warm doulaed space creates  
a container that changes not only the entire way both individuals 
can experience disability but the ways disability communities can be 
formed. (2018, 241) 
 
Piepzna-Samarasinha is describing here both a type of  ethos needed for generating new 
communities and the ethos of  such already-existing alternative communities. Access 
intimacy is a practical ethos in that, while it might reject the notion of  a set of  preexisting 
moral principles to which one’s actions ought to conform, it nevertheless relies on the 
habitual formation of  everyday, embodied actions and relations.
Our everyday habits and relations are not only repetitive acts. They are what Hamington 
describes as “physical anchors that can be used as launching points for the imagination” 
(2004, 96). For Piepzna-Samarasinha, crip doulaship relies on “crip wealth,” or the 
myriad ways in which disabled folks develop knowledges, skills, and “wildly imaginative 
solutions” to navigating the everyday. It illuminates the ways in which “disabled people 
. . . [think] of  ideas abled people never would have, primarily by focusing their time and 
efforts on using what they do have, the space between them, rather than putting their 
attention on the limitation or lack of  ability.” Crip wealth recognizes these ways of  living 
without sensationalizing them. Piepzna-Samarasinha aptly describes crip wealth as “the 
gift of  [disabled individuals] being the normal” (2018, 252). It is a centering of  what we 
might call the “disabled every day” in order to build a space where shame and strangeness 
about everyday tasks have no place. Crip wealth and crip doulaship are integral to access 
intimacy. They act as expressions of  the everyday, practical ways in which one might take 
responsibility for our inevitable encroachments on others in ways that enhance another’s 
freedom rather than alienate it.
As a practical ethos, access intimacy also centers the shared work “to build the 
conversations and piece together the relationship and [the] trust that we know we [disabled 
folks] need for access—that we know we need in order to survive.” This trust moves the 
work of  access outside simply the realm of  logistics and into the realm of  relationships, 
“understanding disabled people as humans, not burdens” (Mingus 2017). The rejection 
of  burden language is accompanied by an understanding of  the positive project of  access 
intimacy as taking on and building a shared map or topography of  access, whereby in 
virtue of  the connections constituting such a project, the conditions in which one enacts 
one’s aims shift. Within relations of  access intimacy, one becomes differently oriented 
and able to generate different capacities. For instance, as Ami Harbin describes in her 
work on disorientation, in situations of  illness, one may “need to pay attention to [her] 
own or others’ bodies more than usual, to care for them differently, or to stop using 
them in ways we have done unthinkingly in the past” (2016, 100). Disorientations can, 
according to Harbin, have “tenderizing effects” and produce a variety of  capacities (119). 
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Such effects include a heightened ability to sense vulnerability, to live unprepared and 
against the grain of  dominant norms, and to develop a shared communal feeling, or what 
she calls “in-this-togetherness” (112). Harbin’s use of  the term “tenderizing” refers to the 
ways in which our taken for granted habits and expectations become more pliable and 
changeable, allowing one to “embody social norms and practiced habits of  interaction 
differently, in ways more responsive to the ways the fragility, relationality, and non-ideal 
realities of  the world affect lives” (120). When one’s habits and practices are “tenderized,” 
they generate a portal, an openness to the needs of  others around them. This allows one to 
realize relevant and achievable needs, but also such needs that are unexpected, inexpressible, 
and perhaps presently cannot be met. An ethos of  accessibility inspired by access intimacy 
more fundamentally shifts one’s relation to others and to an ableist world. It rejects the tacit 
acceptance of  the values of  control, mastery, and certainty and the norms of  independence 
and self-reliance. Such an ethos instead involves a choice, whether conscious or unconscious, 
to begin with the awareness of  our fundamental connectedness to and reliance on one 
another for the development of  more liberatory forms of  relating and belonging. 
The goal of  access intimacy, we might say, is to invite us to recognize the ways in 
which we are already infiltrating each other’s worlds and to take responsibility for that. For 
example, an “inter-abled” relationship may demand an acknowledgment of  an inherent 
power imbalance given our current ableist world.13 The response to this ought not be to 
aim to “correct” that imbalance by trying to make the disabled partner “more like” the 
abled partner in terms of  developing normalized paths of  independence, but to demand 
the abled partner inhabit the world of  the disabled partner and to take on and grapple with 
the conditions of  ableism as their own (since, in the critical phenomenological rendering of  
intimacy, they are, in a sense, their own). As a liberatory approach to access, access intimacy 
does not produce or demand specifics like an “accessibility checklist,” wherein if  everything 
were “checked off” access would be achieved. Rather, access intimacy is about incubating 
shared plans of  action as a space of  empowerment and intimacy, or empowered intimacy, 
we might say. As Harbin writes:
 
Being tenderized leads to capacities to relate to vulnerable others 
more gently and generously and to exercise one’s powers more 
reluctantly . . . . One comes to relate to others and a moral landscape 
in more tentative, dynamic ways that can change in keeping with 
changes in that landscape. (2016, 122)
 
Access intimacy involves a rigorous ethos of  accessibility. Such an ethos is ongoing and 
shifting. At base, it requires others, leading to dependencies and uncertainties that demand 
accountability, both momentary and enduring. Above all, access intimacy is about shifting 
our values to emphasize freedom through connection and collective, rather than individual, 
responsibility for access.
13 By “inter-abled” I mean a relationship where one partner is disabled and another is non-disabled.
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